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CHARLES W. WRIGHT

A Moral Paradox of Martial Training
It is widely accepted by practitioners that at least one aim of martial training is
moral development. It is equally well known that proficiency in a martial discipline often fosters egocentrism. I propose to examine this tension between the moral
aspirations of martial discipline and the all too familiar failings of many advanced
practitioners from the perspective of evolutionary biology and social psychology.
First I will review the origins of what I call the moral imperative of Aikido and
the role that perspective taking in Aikido training can play in opening the door to
moral development. I’ll then consider how certain evolved propensities that organize human behavior — the pursuit of social status and in-group solidarity — can
commandeer martial training that could be directed toward moral self-cultivation.
The capacity of Aikido to support the development of empathic awareness of others
will be, so to speak, bypassed while the discipline is pressed into the service of status
seeking and in-group solidarity. I will conclude with some reflections on the significance of these evolved dispositions for the project of moral self-cultivation.

I start with what I hope is a relatively uncontroversial claim, which is that responsible
practitioners of traditional martial arts suppose that one aim of martial training is
the cultivation of moral character. Needless to say, there is quite a lot packed into
the qualifiers “responsible” and “traditional.” Implicit in them are claims to the effect
that, for example, training in mixed martial arts as preparation for competition in the
Ultimate Fighting Championships or some such will not share this goal. I could be
wrong, though. Despite my prejudices, there could well be some kind of morally commendable development of character taking place in such training venues. Still, I don’t
want to get bogged down just now in parsing the varieties of moral virtue that different martial forms and aspirations might or might not cultivate. So I shall simply and
hopefully assert that some martial practitioners explicitly endorse the aspiration that
their training should foster some kind of moral development. It is to this aspiration I
want to turn my attention. Let me now also quickly narrow the scope of my discussion
to Aikido, because this is the martial art with which I have most extensive experience.
It may be the case that the dynamic that I describe here is equally true of practitioners
of other martial arts. I strongly suspect that it might be, but I have neither the experiential nor the evidentiary basis for making such claims.
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The Moral Imperative of Aikido
Practitioners of Aikido like to emphasize the status of their art as a “gentle” or “nonviolent” martial art and frequently invoke the words of the art’s founder, Morihei
Ueshiba, on reconciliation, empathy, love and the like. One representative passage
should be sufficient to illustrate this feature of the Aikido ethos:
Aikido does not rely on weapons or brute force to succeed, instead we put
ourselves in tune with the universe, maintain peace in our own realms, nurture
life, and prevent death and destruction. The true meaning of the term Samurai
is one who serves and adheres to the power of love. (Stevens, 1992, p. 45)

Some technical observations will also help to explain this idea that Aikido is a path
of gentleness and harmony. First, with few exceptions, Aikido techniques are designed
to respond to, rather than initiate, aggression. Without an attacker, Aikido techniques
are for the most part nonfunctional. They’re certainly no good for breaking boards or
bricks. Second, the techniques in Aikido are constructed to make it possible to control aggression with a relative minimum of harm to the aggressor. In principle, if not
necessarily in practice, the techniques of Aikido — when properly executed — should
allow the defender to protect the attacker as well as himself.1 While the competent
practitioner need not seriously injure an attacker, Aikido techniques still can be used
to inflict very serious damage, if one chooses. Applied with violent, destructive intent,
they can yield commensurate results. Thus it is not the techniques of Aikido alone that
ensure that minimum harm is done to the attacker, but rather the intent of the practitioner. And, so, to act in a manner commensurate with the nonaggressive ethos of
Aikido it becomes important that the practitioner cultivate a certain character. Yukio
Utada Sensei, my first teacher, described this endeavor in terms of “wearing away the
ego.” The Founder spoke also in terms of cultivating love. In another representative
statement he says, for instance, that
All life is a manifestation of the spirit, the manifestation of love. And Aikido is
the purest form of that principle. A warrior is charged with bringing a halt to
all contention and strife. (Stevens, 1992, p. 41)

Thus, to practice Aikido as the Founder thought it ought to be practiced, and as the
great majority of practitioners also say it ought to be practiced, one must empty oneself of the propensities for violence, competition, and self-aggrandizement that arise in
one’s psyche. Further, it is supposed in the community of practitioners that training in
Aikido should cultivate the requisite moral and psychic dispositions. This is what I call
the moral imperative of Aikido.
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Mystical Origins of the Moral Imperative
The moral imperative can be traced back to the Founder’s experiences of mystical
insight. These have been fairly well documented (Stevens, 1987), so I will not dwell
on the particulars. For our purposes, what counts is what Ueshiba Sensei learned from
these experiences. As so often is the case with mystical experiences, what he learned
was that all things are connected, that all beings are in some fundamental sense kin.
From the martial arts perspective this mystical perspective raises interesting issues. The
enemy, the attacker, is the paradigm case of the Other. A resolute duality is fundamental to the relationship of attacker and attacked. Yet, from the nondual perspective
of mystical insight, the enemy is also friend, kin, and, ultimately, self. This is why
Ueshiba Sensei would say things like “harming another is harming oneself.”
Thus, the experience of the mystical unity of the cosmos posed for the Founder
the challenge of creating a martial practice that acknowledges the ultimate kinship
of defender and attacker. The solution Ueshiba Sensei proposed was first to modify
the jutsu he had learned so that they could be applied with minimal harm to the attacker. But he also modified the goal of martial training. Victory in combat with an
enemy was no longer the primary goal. Instead, it became victory over the egocentric
propensities in one’s own soul that give rise to conflict in the first place. This is the
principle of masagatsu agatsu, “true victory is victory over oneself ” (or, “true victory
of self-mastery”). Thus the ultimate purpose of training in Aikido is to foster in the
practitioner the same moral perspective achieved by Ueshiba Sensei. But whereas the
Founder gained his moral perspective through mystical insight, the everyday practitioner must cultivate it through other means.
Before I proceed further, let me add a few more words on the nondual perspective
arising from mystical insight. This perspective shows us that conflict rests on two fundamental dualities. The first is ontological: I am not that other. The second is moral:
I am right (or good) and that other is wrong (or bad). The first duality is arguably a
condition for the possibility of sentient life. Finding something to eat and avoiding
becoming something else’s meal would seem to be impossible without the capacity
to distinguish between self and other. As for the second, the very existence of social
order probably depends upon the duality of right and wrong. This duality pervades
the waking lives of most humans most of the time, and may also play a role in some
mammalian social systems. It is hard to see how the social conflicts humans are typically embroiled in could arise if one side didn’t think itself right, and the other wrong.
This isn’t to say that these dualisms cause or precipitate conflict. Usually the proximate cause is some particular desire for some particular state of affairs, realization of
which someone else is impeding. But they are ultimate causes. Remove them and
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the ground for conflict evaporates. That’s why mystical insight can so often be such
a powerful force for nonviolence. Both dualisms are abandoned. Ontologically, I am
that other. Ethically, I and that other are both equally right and wrong.
The Founder’s basic insight was that attacker and defender are kin, are ultimately in
some sense the same self. In what follows, I’ll suggest that one way this moral perspective might be captured in everyday, not mystical, experience is through perspective
taking. My supposition is that when people bring themselves to the point that they are
able to understand how an action, situation, or problem looks from the perspective of
another person, they will for that moment have eliminated the two dualities that are
at the root of interpersonal conflict. In what follows I’ll explain how the structure of
practice in Aikido allows for the cultivation of such perspective taking.

Perspective Taking and Martial Practice
In Aikido we practice techniques in pairs. One person takes the role of attacker, one
of defender. The attack is prescribed, as is the technique. For a period, two people
practice one attack-technique combination while regularly changing roles as attacker
and defender. Then the instructor introduces a new attack-technique combination,
and new pairs form to practice it. And so forth. More innovative teachers do a lot of
tinkering with this pattern, but that’s the basic training structure.
Now one ethical requirement associated with this training — no surprise — is that
each partner must practice in a manner compatible with the other’s capacities. For
obvious reasons, this requirement protects the less experienced students. A second
ethical responsibility for the more advanced practitioners — again, no surprise — is to
help their less advanced partners improve their technique. The instructor oversees the
entire training venue, of course, and can intervene to offer corrections and suggestions
for improvement. But a great deal of the teaching that takes place occurs in the interactions between more and less experienced practitioners as they work on a technique.
These two ethical requirements, along with the less experienced practitioner’s particular level of ability, effectively impose limits on the more experienced practitioner’s
training. The speed, power, rhythm, flow, and aerobic quality of the practice are constrained by these factors. The opportunity for moral training that I shall highlight
is located in the more experienced practitioner’s response to this situation. In what
follows, I’ll consider two basic types of responses available to the more senior student.
One family of responses I’ll call egocentric. What defines the situation in this case
is the senior student’s desire to improve his technique. Training for such a student
is about himself and his own technical development. Because the less experienced
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person won’t be able to do much to help him improve — won’t be able to challenge
him, correct weaknesses in his technique, allow him to train at the level of intensity
that he thinks necessary for his own development — the limit imposed by the other
is experienced as a limit. The advanced practitioner is kept from doing what he wants
because he must work at his partner’s level. To be sure, there is some value in learning
to control one’s impatience in such a situation, and more value to be found in being
gracious about it. But the basic pattern here is one in which one practitioner experiences another as a constraint and fundamentally responds to this constraint with some
mixture of impatience, dissatisfaction, or disappointment.
This is practice in the absence of perspective taking. In this instance, both the dualities at the root of social conflict seem to me to be left more or less intact. Ontologically,
this is fairly plain to see. Insofar as the junior partner is experienced as an impediment
to the more experienced practitioner’s aims, the latter is unlikely to see the former as
like himself, as a kindred being. Her status as an impediment ensures that the less experienced practitioner remains an Other for her more experienced partner. Matters are
not quite so straightforward from the ethical perspective, however, since there appears
to be no obvious issue of right and wrong, no moral conflict. But if we look a little
more closely at the experienced practitioner’s fundamental response of dissatisfaction,
impatience, and disappointment, certain dimensions of a situation of ethical conflict
will emerge.
The first thing we might notice is that this affective response bears a family resemblance to the emotions that are typically elicited in response to moral violations
— outrage, anger, resentment, disappointment, and the like. It would be a clear exaggeration to claim on the basis of this similarity that the egocentric practitioner reacts as if her less experienced partner, by virtue of her inexperience, has committed a
moral wrong. I think, though, that we can see how this resemblance points toward the
persistence of the ethical duality if we consider certain general features of a morally
egocentric perspective.
As I am using the term here, an egocentric perspective on a situation can be understood to consist in the supposition — usually implicit — that an individual’s expectations, settled convictions, or wishes concerning how the world ought to be ordered
are normative, are what define right and wrong. In a situation or circumstance that
does not fit an egocentric individual’s expectations, settled convictions or wishes, that
person’s response is typically to suppose — to both feel and think — that something
is wrong. Since I am speaking of moral egocentrism generally, we need not suppose
that the egocentric individual necessarily has self-centered desires or expectations. The
religious fundamentalist who sincerely believes that the well-being of all humanity
depends upon their adherence to the particular creed she endorses is egocentric in
the sense that I am using the term here. Egocentrism in this sense is simply the felt
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conviction that one’s own perspective on an issue is normative, that others ought to or
do share this perspective, and that something is wrong when the expectations, settled
convictions, or wishes making up this perspective are frustrated or disappointed.
In the more particular case of the egocentric Aikido practitioner under consideration, the perspective that he takes to be normative also happens to be self-centered.
It is a kind of generalized self-centeredness — an implicit supposition that all persons
involved in this martial practice seek principally to develop their own proficiency.
Proceeding from this basic supposition, other persons who in some respect frustrate or
impede this aspiration will as a result elicit the response — felt and thought — that a
kind of normative expectation has been violated, that something just isn’t right. So we
can see that the experience of impatience, frustration, or disappointment in response
to the opportunity to train with a less experienced practitioner indicates that the ethical duality — that the self ’s expectations are normative (are “right”), and other is
violating normative expectations (is “wrong”) — is also left intact.
I’ll call the other family of responses decentered. This is the response of one who
does not experience the limitations of the other’s technique as an impediment, but as
an opportunity. In this case, what the more experienced practitioner wants is to be of
help to the other. To really be of assistance to another, it helps a great deal to engage
in some perspective taking. It is in this perspective taking that I think we can see one
important root for the moral development that O’Sensei2 endorsed.
Perspective taking can offer insight into several different dimensions of the less experienced practitioner’s experience. One of these would be the dimension of physical
coordination. In taking the perspective of the other, the more experienced practitioner
would gain insight into matters such as particular ways her partner’s body has not yet
learned to move, unconscious physical habits that obstruct correct form, points of
balance he has not yet learned to recognize, and the like. The more experienced practitioner returns to beginner’s mind — in the sense that she recalls all the things her own
body has learned, experienced and undergone, drawing on her kinesthetic memory of
what physical dispositions have and have not allowed techniques to work.
In addition to physical dimensions to the development of technique, perspective
taking also allows the decentered practitioner to gain insight into how the other’s
mental states may affect his learning. She attends to issues such as whether her partner
is afraid to fall, whether certain motions cause her to flinch or otherwise lose focus on
the technique, whether the physical proximity required by Aikido techniques causes
her discomfort, what this person’s response to frustration is, what level of frustration
advances practice, what level retards it, and so forth.
Adding another level of reflexivity, perspective taking further allows the more advanced practitioner to grasp how her own comportment toward the less experienced
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student affects the latter’s learning. She can observe how her particular approach to
interacting with her partner might be creating frustration or understanding, anxiety or
comfort, widened perception or information overload, and so forth.
These several dimensions of perspective taking culminate, I’d like to suggest, when
the more experienced practitioner is able to genuinely take pleasure in the other’s
achievements. Adopting the perspective of her less experienced partner, the more experienced practitioner is able to gain insight into the particular impediments that
she is struggling with in her attempt to master the technique. She understands the
impediments from the perspective of her partner. When one of those impediments
dissolves for a moment and the technique flows a little more easily, she understands
this dissolution from the perspective of her partner as well. Insofar as this dissolution
of an impediment to development elicits pleasure in the junior partner, it will elicit
pleasure in the more experienced practitioner as well. Indeed, the more experienced
practitioner may experience greater pleasure at the breakthrough than her junior partner because she understands better what has just happened.
My suggestion is that in such instances of vicarious pleasure in another’s achievement we encounter a micro scale realization of the mystic’s macro scale ontological
insight into the interconnection of things. The decentered comportment of the more
experienced practitioner represents, as it were, a practical acknowledgement of the ontological interconnection of the practice partners. The dissolution of the impediment
to development with which the junior partner is struggling is the practical realization
of this interconnectedness. The more advanced practitioner’s vicarious pleasure in the
junior student’s advance arises from the former’s perspective taking mediated experience of the latter’s breakthrough. It is a mutual experience, made possible by a brief
falling away of the ontological duality of self and other.
The ethical duality — the sense that one is right and the other wrong — has also
been abandoned in this situation. Obviously, it was abandoned initially simply by
the more experienced practitioner’s decision to adopt a decentered orientation in the
training session. But what I want to suggest is that consistent cultivation of the perspective taking entailed by the decentered perspective may help to foster a stable disposition toward not assuming that one’s own default perspective is the only possible or
legitimate perspective. As an example, consider the judgment “this technique is easy.”
From the perspective of the egocentric practitioner, this judgment becomes normative
and the less experienced practitioner’s technical awkwardness is treated as a shortcoming or failure.
The decentered practitioner, by contrast, understands that “this technique is easy”
is a judgment only possible from her own particular perspective, that of an experienced practitioner. The perspective of the junior partner is something quite different,
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insight into which is to be gained through perspective taking. Consistent cultivation
of such perspective taking, I’d like to suggest, can contribute to the reduction of egocentric propensities (can help “wear away the ego”) as the practitioner develops a stable
disposition to see the world from a diversity of perspectives distinct from her own.
This cultivation will allow the decentered practitioner to loosen her grip on her own
perspective, to let go of the near-automatic assumption that one’s own expectations,
settled convictions and wishes about how the world should be are normative.
Before moving on, I’d like first to anticipate a pair of misunderstandings. First, I do
not mean to suggest that this decentered comportment necessarily results in improved
learning for the less experienced practitioner. I’m not sure about that, and it isn’t hard
to imagine that, for some people at least, being egocentrically corrected by an impatient advanced practitioner might spur them on to more intense effort and so to more
rapid technical learning. My suggestion, rather, is that the decentered approach opens
the way for certain kinds of moral development and insight in the more experienced
practitioner that the egocentric approach closes off.
Second, I also recognize that no one person ever purely manifests just one or another of these two orientations. Every individual embodies a mixture of the types. But
while none of us is a purely decentered or egocentric practitioner, the opportunity for
moral development will depend on which type predominates, and to what degree.

Training Augments Egocentrism
When I first started practicing Aikido, I was convinced that this moral development
was an almost automatic result of earnest training. There were apocryphal stories in
my first dojo of some of Utada Sensei’s long time students who had entered as aggressive, competitive, self-centered people and then after years of training had been
transformed. But then I began hearing stories of the political struggles and personal
rivalries (indeed, animosities) among the highest ranking practitioners — the heads of
other dojos and national organizations. This certainly didn’t sound like the behavior
of people who had been wearing away their egos. This is where we get to the moral
paradox referenced in the title. Aikido is an art that is in principle dedicated to developing compassion for others, yet many of the highest-ranking practitioners seem to
be as egocentric as anybody else. Indeed, their egocentric orientation might even have
been reinforced by their technical proficiency because it draws so much admiring and
uncritical attention from aspiring practitioners. In what follows, I’d like to draw on
insights from evolutionary biology and recent social psychology to offer an account of
how an art meant to be dedicated to the wearing away of the ego can end up simply
reinforcing it. What this account will underscore is one dimension of Master Ueshiba’s
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insight — that if the martial training is to have the formative effect he envisioned, it
must also at the same time be a kind of religious training.
Let me turn now to the factors that encourage practitioners to use their proficiency
as a vehicle for reinforcing, rather than reducing their egos. I’ll start with status competition. It probably isn’t news to most of us that humans are prone to compete with one
another for social prestige. In the Republic Plato worried about the corrosive effects of
pleonexia. For Rousseau, in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, status competition was the sprout out of which all more developed forms of social inequality grew.
Primatologists and sociobiologists have in recent years helped us to see how very deep
rooted this propensity is. To appreciate the force of their insight, let’s remind ourselves
of the basic pattern of natural selection. A heritable trait — be it morphological or
behavioral — that confers greater fitness on a member of a population will, in time,
spread throughout the population. The coin of fitness, of course, is reproductive success, leaving behind more offspring who themselves survive to reproductive age. Now
the trait in question is status seeking — or, in language less pleasant to egalitarian ears
— the pursuit of social dominance. If high status or social dominance allows some
individuals in a population of social animals to enjoy greater reproductive success than
subordinate individuals, and if this propensity to seek social dominance is a heritable
trait, then the propensity will spread throughout the population.
As it happens, the evidence that socially dominant animals enjoy greater reproductive success is fairly unambiguous. Dominant males typically enjoy greater access to
food and estrous females (Boehm, 1999). Dominant females are better nourished, are
less subject to harassment, have shorter between-birth intervals, have a greater proportion of their offspring survive to reproductive age, and in some cases even enjoy the
prerogative of killing the infants of subordinate members of their own group (Hrdy
1981).
The same general pattern can be observed in human societies. Evidence from foraging societies suggests that the most important variable for explaining the prevalence
of hunting among foragers may be the prestige benefits enjoyed by successful hunters (Hawkes, 1991, 2002). The resources at the disposal of high-status persons in
developed nations is evident for all to see. Just as high prestige brings rewards, so low
prestige carries costs. A recent report in Science reviewed evidence that low socialeconomic status persons in developed nations experienced significantly worse health
outcomes. Most strikingly, evidence indicated that only a small portion of the connection between socioeconomic status and poor health could be explained by lifestyle
differences. Instead, “the disease consequences of feeling poor are often rooted in the
psychosocial consequences of being made to feel poor by one’s surroundings” (Sapolsky, 2005, p. 652).
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From the perspective of natural selection, then, it is only to be expected that the
pursuit of social rank and the perquisites of power that accompany rank will be among
the oldest and most deeply rooted drives in our motivational economy. In the words of
primatologist Frans deWaal (1996),
The desire to dictate the behavior of others is such a timeless and universal
attribute of our species that it must rank with the sex drive, maternal instinct,
and the will to survive in terms of the likelihood of its being a part of our
biological heritage. (p. 98)

It isn’t hard to see how training in the martial arts takes place in a social environment
optimally configured to elicit competitive prestige seeking. The social structure of the
dojo is built around a clear hierarchy of rank established through public demonstrations of proficiency in the discipline. A person’s status within the training community
is intimately linked to conferred rank. Advancement to higher ranks and, thus, higher
prestige is also typically associated with competitive success — with victory, or at
least credible performance in martial competition. It is not hard to see how the social
dominance achieved through martial training is fundamental and visceral. Aikido is an
exception to this last condition — achievement through competitive success — but as
I’ll suggest a bit later, that doesn’t seem to make all that much difference.
The next factor I’d like to consider is the role of group solidarity in the human
motivational infrastructure. Just as the competitiveness of human beings surprises no
one, few thoughtful observers of human affairs are surprised by the ease with which
humans establish affectively valenced group boundaries. These informal insights have
received abundant empirical support. In the 1950s Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues
reported on the ease with which prepubescent boys with no prior social contact could
be induced to form ingroups with differentiated status positions and reciprocal role expectations. In one remarkable experiment they elicited in-group formation simply by
organizing a series of engaging outdoor activities over the period of a week. They also
found that mere knowledge of the presence of another group in the area elicited strong
desires for competitive interaction. When on-site counselors arranged for a series of
intergroup contests, antagonistic relations quickly developed, leading to such behavior
as name-calling, stereotyping of outgroup members, destruction of outgroup property
and raids on outgroup living quarters (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961).
During the 1970s Henri Tajfel demonstrated experimentally that people categorized
into groups on the basis of factors as trivial as visual judgments or aesthetic preferences
were then disposed to behave differentially toward members of the other group (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, Billig & Bundy, 1971). Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison
Experiment demonstrated the ease with which normal individuals could be induced
to identify with antagonistic roles arbitrarily assigned to them by the experimenter. In
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this experiment, ordinary young college-age adults were induced to adopt the roles,
attitudes, and self-concepts of authoritarian guards and subjugated prisoners. The participants’ self-identification with these roles became so complete that the experiment
had to be ended early out of concern for the participants’ well-being. Particularly striking was the student-guards’ self-perceived gains in power, social status, and ingroup
identification (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973).
I suggest that this propensity to situate oneself within an ingroup/outgroup pattern
and to identify with the ingroup will intersect with and reinforce the status competition in a training community. Each rank represents a potential ingroup of which
the aspiring student could become a member, but I suspect that it is at the higher
ranks that this process becomes more pronounced. Brown belt, the next in line for
black belt, seems to me to be the point at which practitioners begin to take on a
rank-related group identity. Membership in the brown or black belt group confers
prestige — often even outside the dojo — and members experience group solidarity.
It seems to me that the student’s aspiration to achieve rank and enjoy the solidarity of
a prestigious ingroup will, all things being equal, tend to contribute to an egocentric
training orientation with less experienced practitioners and to distract from or devalue
the decentered training orientation. This is because membership in good standing
depends upon regular demonstrations of a particular degree of proficiency, and this
demonstration is most effectively achieved — and as a result, most clearly perceived
by others — when practicing with similarly or higher ranked practitioners. Practice
with a beginner will be unsatisfactory because it does not allow for demonstrations
of proficiency that highlight and reinforce one’s membership in the more prestigious
ingroup, or that advertise one’s eligibility for membership.
These considerations suggest that we should expect the most competitive as well as
the most talented practitioners to rise to the highest ranks in most martial arts. Since
highly competitive individuals sometimes sacrifice other moral commitments on the
alter of victory, it will also happen on occasion that not very nice people end up holding some of the highest-ranking positions. That this is what actually happens goes
almost without saying. This outcome receives a kind of archetypical recognition in the
prevalence of highly skilled martial arts bad guys in popular films and stories.
But Aikido is supposed to be an exception to this pattern, as I’ve indicated already.
The Founder emphasized that training should cultivate compassion and a host of
other socially desirable characteristics. Training in Aikido involves no sparring, tournaments, or other formal competitions. Practitioners are encouraged to aspire to harmony and compassion. Some teachers, recognizing that a ranking system by itself also
encourages competitive prestige seeking, have gone so far as to eliminate formal ranks
(e.g., David Lynch).
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Nevertheless, egocentric people still seem to come out on top — not all the time,
but often enough to be troubling — a fact that elicits commentary within the community of Aikido practitioners from time to time. What’s more, these folks typically
are also skilled in verbal discussions of the way of harmony. They know how to talk the
talk, even as they don’t seem to walk the walk. One conscientious critic has recounted
how he spoke publicly of this disconnect between professed value commitments and
personal conduct before an audience of advanced Aikido practitioners. In this audience were even some individuals whose conduct had prompted his critique, though
(of course) they remained unnamed. After the discussion had ended, some of these
very individuals came up to him, thanked him for his presentation and agreed with
him that he had identified a matter of serious concern for all practitioners. To his astonishment, their compliments were heartfelt and they seemed not to recognize that
he had been talking about their own behavior!
This remarkable episode leads me to the final social-psychological factor giving rise
to the paradox of martial self-cultivation, and that is the role of automatic cognitive
systems in the human mind. In the past couple of decades researchers in social psychology have proposed that human social behavior and cognition can be associated
with two separate cognitive systems (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson,
2000; Zajonc, 1980). One, the controlled system, is the domain of ordinary conscious
awareness and rational thought. This is the system at work when we do math in our
heads, imagine a warm summer’s day in the middle of winter, and try to convince
our colleagues to do things our way. The cognitive operations associated with the
controlled system are typically slow, effortful, and intentionally directed; they require
attention and are available to conscious introspection. The other is the automatic system, also recently dubbed the “adaptive unconscious” (Wilson, 2002). Cognition in
this system is fast, effortless, and not intentionally directed; it requires no attention
and — most important for my purposes here — its operations are largely inaccessible
to conscious introspection.
An obvious and uncontroversial example of such automatic processing is the work
of the visual cortex as it turns light waves received by the eyes into our consciously
experienced visual percepts. More controversial and uncomfortable — especially for
philosophers, it seems — are processes of practical decision making and the interpretation of social situations that also seem to operate automatically. The unsettling
implication of this research is that to a significant degree human beings literally do not
know what they are doing as they go though their daily lives.
The key issue for my purposes is that this dual-process perspective explains rather
neatly how a person can sincerely espouse the values and principles of harmony, noncompetition, and the like while yet behaving in an egocentric manner — by which
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I mean engaging in competitive prestige seeking, orienting oneself primarily to the
perspective, priorities, and opinions of one’s high ranked associates, and experiencing
practice with beginners as a burden, obligation, or constraint. (Or else taking practice
with beginners as an opportunity to assert dominance.) For virtually the entire evolutionary history of the human species, including that of our hominid and pre-hominid
ancestors as well, social rank conferred significant fitness benefits. As a result, competitive status seeking has — so to speak — been built into the adaptive unconscious. By
this I don’t mean that humans (or chimpanzees, for that matter) think to themselves,
“I’d better do what it takes to get some social prestige so that I can leave behind more
babies than the others.” Rather, I mean simply that we do these things because those
individuals who happen to have behaved this way in the evolutionary past also happen
to have had more offspring survive to reproductive age. A behavioral trait that evolved
in response to an enduring adaptive challenge faced by members of an intensely social
species is one that, from the perspective of natural selection, it makes most sense to put
on automatic, since this mode of processing is energetically cheap and, in a relatively
invariant environment, highly reliable.
The source of the moral paradox in the practice of Aikido, then, lies in the disconnect between our controlled and automatic systems of cognition. Humans can act
on the propensity to seek social prestige and dominance over others even as we consciously disavow this goal and embrace a different set of values.

Mindfulness
To close I would like briefly now to consider what this conclusion means for the martial practitioner genuinely committed to the project of moral self-cultivation. Whether
anything might be done to keep egocentric people from rising to the highest ranks is
another matter — one about which I am not sanguine, and which I will simply put
aside. But for the individual there is something to be done, a practice that allows one
to grapple with the aspirations of the adaptive unconscious. Buddhists call it mindfulness, and this will be the label that I use, but the basic practice is recognized and
endorsed by all of the world’s major religious traditions. The practice is really very
straightforward. One simply attends to what arises in one’s mind. Sitting meditation
is one locus for this practice, and mindfulness is the extension of this practice to one’s
waking life. The practice consists in careful, persistent observation of what arises in
one’s mind and of how one behaves in relation to these mental events. According to
the dual-process perspective the information processing and affective valencing that
gives rise to ideas, goals, intentions, emotional responses and the like takes place out
of the reach of the conscious mind. But the results of these unconscious processes are
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available to conscious awareness — if one is paying attention. By paying attention one
can observe the products of the adaptive unconscious arising in one’s mind, the circumstances in which these responses typically are elicited, and how particular behavioral responses or patterns are associated with these circumstances and mental events.
We needn’t suppose a person ever perceives a causal connection between the mental
events and one’s behavior — here we may indeed have recourse only to Hume’s constant conjunction, as far as our introspective abilities go. But for practical purposes,
what we get seems to be enough.
There’s a great deal more to be said about the practice of mindfulness — in particular, about how a growing familiarity with the associations between mental states and
one’s typical emotional and behavioral reactions in particular circumstances can then
be put to use toward abandoning those impulses. But this would take us rather far
afield from the immediate topic of this essay. And in any case, the point with which
I’d like to close these reflections does not require us to go into such detail. This point
is only that if martial training — in Aikido in particular, but in any other discipline as
well — is to serve the goal of moral self-cultivation, then the martial practice will have
to be infused with or augmented by this practice of self-observation.
I’m tempted to say that martial practitioners will have to get religion, but that’s
probably incorrect. On the one hand, mindfulness — or whatever we call this practice
of self-observation — has traditionally been a religious practice in the sense, first, that
it seems to have its most definitive origins in the context of religious traditions, as
well as, second, that the practice was conceived as a vehicle for removing egocentric
impediments to the experience of transcendent reality, however we may name that.
Now the moral effect of this practice was also widely recognized to consist in a gradual
abandonment of the attachments out of which a sense of separate self was established
and nourished. I can see no reason in principle why this moral effect could not be
achieved through a practice of mindfulness removed from its traditional religious context. Moral aspiration alone may motivate some individuals to engage in this practice
as effectively as the aspiration to experience mystical union with a transcendent reality
motivates others. But by whatever name we call it, and whatever the particular motivation that engages the practitioner, martial training in the absence of such practical
self-awareness seems destined simply to serve our ancient evolved aspirations.
Chuck Wright is an Associate Professor of Philosophy with the rank of Nidan (second degree
black belt) in Aikido, a Japanese martial art that he has practiced for more than 20 years. A
condensed version of this essay was presented at a meeting of the Society for the Study of Philosophy and the Martial Arts at the Pacific Division meeting of the American Philosophical
Association on April 10, 2009 in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
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Notes
1.

These notions of “minimum harm” or “protecting the attacker” call for some comment as well. My perspective on this matter is that instead of breaking bones and dislocating joints, Aikido techniques allow
the skilled practitioner to inflict levels of physical discomfort and exercise degrees of physical control
sufficient to discourage and frustrate the attacker. Under most circumstances in civil society, it won’t be
necessary to inflict much harm to achieve this end. There will be some circumstances, though, where
dislocating or breaking something might be necessary, and where such measures would count as minimum harm in relation to the genuinely deadly intent of the attacker. “Gentle,” in other words, depends
on the circumstances. This perspective is far from universally shared among practitioners of Aikido.
Some write and speak as if the attacker should experience no injury, harm, or damage whatsoever.
I have doubts whether discouraging a determined attacker could ever be achieved with such a soft
touch, but that, as well, is another issue.

2.

O’Sensei is an honorific form of the Japanese word for teacher (sensei) which translates roughly as
“great teacher.” The term is quite commonly used among practitioners of Aikido to refer to the founder
of Aikido, Morihei Ueshiba.

72

No . 2 7 — 2 0 1 0

